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Should Central Banks Have Constraints During a Crisis? A Mini-Course With Paul Tucker (Part 1)

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Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell. Photo by the Federal Reserve, via Flickr.

The Federal Reserve and the ECB have been taking unprecedented steps to react to the financial impact of Covid-19. To frame the debate around the limits and legitimacy of central bankers’ extraordinary decisions, watch this Stigler Center mini-course with Sir Paul Tucker, who was deputy governor at the Bank of England during the 2008 global financial crisis. 

This is the first of three stand-alone, interrelated seminars with Sir Paul Tucker on his latest book Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State.

Sir Paul Tucker is a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and chair of the Systemic Risk Council. He previously served as deputy governor at the Bank of England and as a member of the G20 Financial Stability Board’s Steering Group, chairing a group on Too Big To Fail. In 2014, Tucker was knighted by Britain for his services to central banking.

Topics covered in the first part of Tucker’s mini-course:

  • The problem of unelected administrative power and (flawed) justifications for it
  • Credible commitment as the key ingredient to constraining administrative power
  • The need for insulation from quotidian politics and the democratic deficit in central banks
  • Why legitimacy matters
  • Tucker’s Principles for Delegation and related implications for antitrust and prudential supervision

Also, check this excerpt from Paul Tucker’s book on ProMarket

“My central argument is that if a democracy gives too much power to formally de-politicized technocrats, then almost inevitably they and the policy field they are responsible for become re-politicized. But that’s worse than not delegating, because it would be politicized policy in the hands of technocrats who we don’t elect.”

Or read our interview with Tucker:

I think you’re taking a great risk when you have an existential guarantor that is not a proper political body. The ECB needs to find a way to navigate its way out of that, and in a recent speech Mario Draghi started to address this point.

And a discussion between Kade Waldock and Luigi Zingales in this Capitalisn’t episode:

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